CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FIFTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 21 August 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Gheorghe Chirila (Romania)

GE.90-62607/2381B

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the 575th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

The Conference will continue today the consideration of the reports of ad hoc subsidiary bodies and the consideration and adoption of the annual report to the United Nations General Assembly. However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any representative wishing to raise a matter pertinent to the work of the Conference may do so. As I announced at our last plenary meeting, I shall submit for decision by the Conference today, when we have exhausted the list of speakers, the recommendation contained in paragraph 16 of the progress report of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. Following that I shall invite the Conference to take note with appreciation of the report of the Chairman of the informal open-ended consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference, which is contained in document CD/WP.395. Then the Conference will hold an informal meeting to consider the draft decision in document CD/WP.396, which the secretariat has distributed today. Immediately thereafter we shall resume the plenary meeting in order to adopt the draft decision.

I have on the list of speakers for today the representative of Sweden, who will speak in his capacity as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons; the representatives of the Netherlands, Australia and India; the representative of Japan, who will speak in his capacity as the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban; the representative of Canada, who will speak in his capacity as the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space; and the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Hyltenius, to introduce the report of the Ad hoc Committee as contained in document CD/1033.

Mr. HYLTENIUS (Sweden): Before introducing to the Conference the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, which I have had the honour to chair during the 1990 session, I should like to congratulate you, Mr. President, on the effective manner in which you are performing your duties as President during this month. I should also like to thank your predecessor, Ambassador Sujka, for the skill with which he carried out this task in July.

It is with much regret that I note that my distinguished colleague and friend, Ambassador Reese of Australia, will leave the Conference soon. He has made outstanding contributions to our work. I wish him every success in his future important functions.

The report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, which is contained in document CD/1033, was adopted by the Committee on 10 August. It contains, as in earlier years, three parts: a technical part; Appendix I, the so-called "rolling text" proper; and Appendix II, which includes material for future work.

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

In the technical part, I should like to draw attention to the fact that the mandate was changed this year, most notably by the deletion of the phrase "except for its final drafting". Among the positive developments this year reflected in this part of the report is also the increased participation of States not members of the CD. This bodes well for the efforts to achieve, eventually, broad adherence to the convention, once it has been concluded.

You may also note that the Technical Group on Instrumentation was re-established under the leadership of Ms. Rautio of Finland and, further, that several days were devoted to a special meeting with representatives of the chemical industry. In that connection, meetings devoted to specific topics were chaired by Mr. Molander and Mr. Santesson of my delegation. I should like to express my deep gratitude to Ms. Rautio, Mr. Molander and Mr. Santesson for their important contributions to our work.

May I also draw the attention of the Conference to the inter-sessional work foreseen for the period of 26 November-21 December 1990 and to the resumed session recommended to be held on 8-18 January 1991. On the basis of extensive consultations which I have undertaken with the Working Group chairmen, with the Friends of the Chair and with delegations, I should like to propose the following subjects for the inter-sessional work:

Working Group A: review of verification parts of the annexes to articles IV, V and VI; review of the Protocol on Inspection Procedures, Parts I and II;

Working Group B: annex on chemicals and related issues; article III;

Working Group C: measures to redress a situation; settlement of disputes; amendments (improvement of the text); financial aspects of the Organization.

I also propose to ask the Friends of the Chair to continue their work on article X and on jurisdiction and control, while I should conduct consultations on article XI and on the general pattern of verification. Finally, it is proposed that the Bureau prepare proposals for editing of the "rolling text", which can be dealt with during the inter-sessional work.

In the concluding paragraph of the technical part, reference is made to the appointment of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for next year. Since the report was adopted on 10 August I have continued my consultations on this question. I am pleased to inform you that my consultations have indicated that there is consensus on the recommendation that the Conference on Disarmament appoint the Leader of the Soviet delegation, Ambassador Sergei Batsanov, to be Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for 1991.

The Friends of the Chair have carried out difficult tasks in working on solutions to some specific problems, namely on article X, on old chemical weapons and on jurisdiction and control. I am very grateful indeed to

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

Ambassador García Moritán of Argentina, Ambassador Morel of France and Ambassador Reese of Australia for accepting to undertake this work. Due to their skill and dedication it has been possible to advance the work on these issues. Some of the results are reflected in the report which I am submitting today.

The Chair conducted open-ended consultations on the question of undiminished security, which soon came to focus on the question of universal adherence to the forthcoming convention. Open-ended consultations were also conducted on various aspects of the Executive Council and on article IX. Much work was done, especially on article IX, and it is the hope of the Chair that this work will not prove to have been in vain. Also, outside the Conference many countries worked on this issue through trial inspections and shared their experiences with other delegations by submitting reports on them in the form of working papers.

The Committee had three Working Groups. Working Group A, on verification issues, was chaired by Mr. Shahbaz of Pakistan and earlier by Mr. Lamazière of Brazil and then temporarily by Mr. Molander of Sweden. Working Group B, on technical matters, was chaired by Mr. Meerburg of the Netherlands, while Working Group C, on legal and institutional questions, was chaired by Mr. Krutzsch of the German Democratic Republic. Substantive and important progress has been made in all the three Working Groups. I should like to express my sincere appreciation and warm thanks to the Working Group chairmen for their untiring efforts and commitment, which have brought the convention closer to its completion within their respective issue areas.

The substantive parts of the report reflect the diligent work carried out this year and the many changes made in the "rolling text". They are well known to delegations, and I will therefore only deal with them briefly.

Among the achievements, I should like to mention especially the texts included in appendix I on verification of alleged use of chemical weapons, on the order of destruction, on amendments and on the settlement of disputes. There are also many other additions and improvements in the text in other parts of the draft convention.

Among the new material in appendix II, I should like to draw your attention to the texts on jurisdiction and control, on old chemical weapons and on measures to redress a situation.

My warm thanks also go to the Secretary of the Ad hoc Committee, Mr. Bensmail, to the Deputy Secretary, Ms. Marcaillou, and to their assistants, Ms. Darby and Ms. Roux, for their very professional work and invaluable assistance. I wish also to express my thanks to the interpreters and all the technical staff who have contributed to making our work proceed in an effective and smooth manner.

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

This year, 1990, has been a year when the political issues have been brought to the forefront. New important elements have been added to the draft convention, and further substantive progress has thus been made towards its completion. At the same time I must note, like last year's Chairman, that the political breakthrough that many of us had hoped for has not occurred this year either. Instead, previously hidden political problems have been highlighted. This is a stage we must get through in order to complete our work. I can only hope that this will be possible in the near future. Time is not working in our favour. Political declarations must soon be translated into a more flexible attitude and a will to make compromises at the negotiating table.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for his introduction of the Committee's report and for his kind words to the Chair. I should like to congratulate him on the conclusion of the work of the Committee, which has been very intensive during his chairmanship. I particularly wish to emphasize here the personal merit of Ambassador Hyltenius and the three co-ordinators of the Working Groups in their joint efforts to move forward the negotiations in this organ of the Conference. I am sure that delegations will have taken note with interest of Ambassador Hyltenius' suggestions regarding the consultations in the inter-sessional period.

I give the floor to the representative of the Netherlands, Ambassador Wagenmakers.

Mr. WAGENMAKERS (Netherlands): First of all, I take pleasure, Mr. President, in offering you my delegation's congratulations on your assumption of the Chair.

We do not know yet when the negotiations on a convention banning all chemical weapons will be concluded. We were more optimistic about a swift conclusion at the beginning of the summer session than at the time when this year's session of the Conference is coming to an end. Nevertheless, we still expect the CW convention to be finalized next year, or in 1992 at the latest. It is, therefore, not too early to consider some consequences of the final outcome of the negotiations. In particular I would like to say a few words about the question of the future seat of the CW treaty Organization, for which The Hague has been proposed as a candidate, first during SSOD-III and again at the opening of this year's spring session of the Conference on 6 February.

After the signature of the convention, a Preparatory Commission will be established to set up the chemical weapons disarmament organization, or "Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons" as it is presently called in the "rolling text". For all practical purposes the Preparatory Commission should preferably have its seat in the same city as the Organization itself. In this way, the Commission could be smoothly transformed into the Conference of States Parties and the Executive Council after the entry into force of the convention. Furthermore, the Commission would be closely involved with the Technical Secretariat in statu nascendi, including its inspectorate and its laboratory.

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons will have a unique character. To establish it in the vicinity of the IAEA would have advantages but also disadvantages. One may expect in such a case that the IAEA Board of Governors and the Executive Council of the CW Organization would, to a large extent, consist of the same persons. This could lead to continuous comparisons between established nuclear safeguards practices on the one hand, and verification measures under the CW convention on the other. But the verification measures required under the CW convention are very different: they have a wider scope and are on occasion more intrusive, albeit generally less precise than nuclear safeguards. Maybe we should also keep in mind that the CW Organization might not follow the United Nations salary system because of its need for some highly qualified experts. This would be more difficult to achieve in a "UN city", or could lead to undesirable tensions between different organizations.

At the first day of this year's spring session, the Netherlands' Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hans van den Broek, repeated his offer to make The Hague the seat of the Organization. Today, we introduce a bid-book which contains a concrete proposal highlighting the substantial financial aspects of that offer. Let me quote directly from the bid-book just circulated, page 13: "The Netherlands is prepared to bear the costs of leasing a building to house the Preparatory Commission and the treaty Organization during the preparatory phase and for a considerable period of time after the signing of the treaty, which would cover half of the transitional period. The Netherlands would also meet the costs of furnishing and equipping the accommodation. One matter requiring further attention during the preparatory phase will be the training of inspectors. The Netherlands is studying the possibility of providing training facilities free of charge".

The bid-book also outlines some further advantages of The Hague as the seat for this particular Organization. These advantages include the presence near The Hague of a renowned laboratory in the CW field, which could be used as a basis for the laboratory needed by the Technical Secretariat. For years, Dr. Ooms, whom you all know, was the Director of that Laboratory. Another asset of The Hague, certainly in view of the foreseeable occurrence of short-notice inspections, are the excellent world-wide airlinks available at Schipol International Airport, half an hour by train from the railway station which lies in the vicinity of the proposed premises for the CW treaty Organization. I may point out that several options for suitable modern office buildings in the centre of The Hague have been indicated in a bid-book.

One other important ingredient for an easy life in this internationally oriented city is the fact that English is generally spoken fluently, as well as often German and French or other languages. Furthermore, The Hague and the Netherlands as a whole offer a range of international educational institutions, foreign television stations, foreign-language theatres, etc.

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

As you all know, the Netherlands, as a member of the Conference on Disarmament, has, from the beginning, actively participated in the chemical weapons negotiations. Numerous contributions have been made in the form of technical and other working papers and in the form of chairmanship of working groups. CW research in the Netherlands has been geared towards the achievement of the convention. We were the first to organize a trial inspection in 1986, followed by an international workshop.

We sincerely hope that members of the Conference will take all these elements into account when deciding on the seat of the future Organization.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Netherlands for his statement and for his kind words to the Chair. We all remember the distinction and skill with which Ambassador Wagenmakers presided over the work in the opening month of this summer session.

I give the floor to the representative of Australia, Ambassador Reese.

Mr. REESE (Australia): Mr. President, at this late stage in our session, this is my first opportunity to acknowledge you in the Chair. Australia is pleased to have you preside over us and we will continue our close co-operation with you when you look after the affairs of the Conference on Disarmament during the months ahead, when the Conference is not in session.

In making a farewell statement to the Conference on Disarmament I am conscious that my time here has been short. Nevertheless, I have experienced two years of intensive negotiations in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons aimed at completing the chemical weapons convention. In the second of these two years my delegation co-ordinated the Western Group in the negotiations.

The energy put into negotiations following the Paris Conference in 1989 resulted in progress being made on many parts of the convention. This should have brought us closer to the completion of the convention. Yet I leave Geneva concerned that this summer we are still some distance from the conclusion of the convention and that there is apprehension that the negotiations are faltering.

We have made valuable progress this year in areas of importance to the convention, such as the main legal aspects, the order of destruction of chemical weapons and a number of technical aspects.

At the beginning of this year, however, we were all aware that progress needed to be made on the central issue of the convention - verification. At the end of this session any assessment would have to conclude that we have failed in this objective. We have failed because of the time it has taken some delegations to put their policies forward and because the differences in approach to the issue are still too wide to bridge. Related to the

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difficulties we have experienced in developing article IX of the convention in regard to the process of challenge inspection, or inspections on request, is the reluctance among delegations to address the problem of decision-making by the Executive Council of the convention in regard to the inspection process.

Australia's approach to verification is predicated on the requirement for an effectively verifiable convention in which we can have confidence in States parties' compliance. This is a matter of critical national security for us. We are concerned about any approach to compliance which would give to the requested State a right simply to refuse an inspection team's access to a suspect site on the basis of the requested State's contention that the side was not relevant to the convention. We recognize the importance of protecting sensitive matters of national security, but believe that a combination of right of access, balanced by some management of that access, would enable the effective operation of the convention. Trial inspections of military facilities conducted by the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany suggest that a satisfactory balance can be struck between the requirements of the inspection process and the security concerns of the inspected State.

I would like to touch on one other area of verification, the proposal for a system of ad hoc inspections. A number of delegations have made clear that they believe the concept should be explored further as part of the overall approach to verification. It offers the possibility of a verification system additional to routine inspections and challenge inspections which would strengthen the level of deterrence of the convention without the same degree of intrusiveness as a challenge inspection.

I do not think that ad hoc inspections can be dismissed as "Disguised challenge inspections" without first having the opportunity to discuss the concept further in the Ad hoc Committee. Yet, some delegations are unwilling to agree to this further discussion. I think it inimical to our processes for delegations to prejudge an issue. It is possible, of course, that, when the whole verification package is finally developed, Governments will not see a need for ad hoc inspections, but we cannot make that judgement now.

Verification may be thought of as a microcosm of the convention, requiring a balance of interests and a willingness to keep a sense of proportion and overall practical balance. It is essentially a political act of assurance among the States parties. Thus, efforts to reduce the elements of confrontation and to increase the sense of shared mutual obligation and support should be the centre of our efforts. The current conceptual framework is adequate in its political content and feasible in its commercial impact. It deserves to be supported, completed and adopted.

In this negotiating period the various approaches to ensuring universality of the convention have caused divisions among us. Our common goal is a convention which is universal in its application, and it is no accident that the issues we find most difficult to resolve are all directly related to this common goal. It is evident that there is no single path to

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universality. There needs to be more flexibility on the part of delegations in this area. Where a proposal is not favoured by some delegations, there should be a greater attempt at an exchange of views to determine the best way of finding common ground.

The chemical weapons convention will offer a package of measures that will be unprecedented in the security and commercial areas. The willingness of States to accept this uniquely complex, politically sensitive and commercially intrusive treaty depends on a subtle balancing of many interests. Because of these complexities, it has taken so many years to get to the point where the convention is within sight. This situation requires all parties to the negotiations to intensify efforts to get the convention concluded.

I think we were all aware that the issues of verification and the character of the Executive Council were going to be the most difficult issues to resolve in developing the convention. We are not at that point, and that may be the reason for the current sense of faltering. But it is also a time when the international community's need for the elimination of chemical weapons could not be more apparent. Recent developments in the Persian Gulf bring home to all of us the concern that while chemical weapons exist there is the danger that they might be used. We believe that the coming decade will see either a worsening of chemical weapons proliferation, in which chemical weapons will become a common feature of many national arsenals, or the effective functioning of an international authority dedicated to the oversight of a total ban on these weapons. It is the moment for us to assess carefully the point we have reached in the negotiations and to determine the best way forward.

In Australia's view, the negotiations are now in need of clear political direction in the absence of which the negotiations may well flounder. A number of other delegations have recently expressed a similar view. Now that the structure and content of the convention is apparent, or, as another delegation has put it, now that all the main issues are on the table, it is essential for Governments to focus on bridging the remaining differences, and particularly in the critical area of verification.

While we do not think artificial deadlines are appropriate, the fact is that setting deadlines is often the only way to bring sufficient concentration and attention to detail to get matters resolved. The alternative is too easily a leisurely pace which leads to opportunities lost as one or several of the many ingredients change. In this regard, we were pleased with the more substantial and comprehensive industry input at the meetings held in June. We welcome the significant achievements in the bilateral agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union. Those agreements need now to be translated into the multilateral environments, since the problems posed by chemical weapons cannot be resolved by bilateral measures alone. We agree with the ideas proposed by some delegations for ministerial meetings in the first half of 1991, to be followed, we believe, by the presentation of the completed convention to the United Nations General Assembly at its forty-sixth session.

(Mr. Reese, Australia)

Of course, a ministerial meeting would need to be well prepared, and in this regard we welcome the informal consultations which Ambassador Hyltenius will undertake between now and the inter-sessionals.

The Conference cannot be allowed to squander the responsibility which we have to the international community to complete the convention as a matter of urgency. The negotiating session in 1991 must be the period for that completion.

Finally, on the subject of chemical weapons I would like to pay tribute to the two chairmen of the Ad hoc Committee during my time here. Both Ambassador Morel in 1989 and Ambassador Hyltenius this year, gave strong leadership to the Committee's work. Both of them showed great professional skills, creativity and tirelessness in their efforts to keep us moving forward. The role of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee is of great importance and I am pleased that the Committee will again enjoy leadership of a high standard in the Chairman for 1991, the head of the Soviet delegation, Mr. Sergei Batsanov.

Of the other issues before the Conference I should like to comment on the constructive outcome of the review of the functioning of the Conference conducted by Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan. Bearing in mind the failure of the Group of Seven's earlier attempts to improve the functioning of the Conference, I was sceptical about the prospects for Ambassador Kamal's consultations. He deserves full credit for his skilled and productive consultations, which will lead to some practical and time-saving improvements in the operation of the Conference.

Given the extent of improvement in the international political climate, I regret that some delegations were not more responsive to proposals for a more critical look at the Conference's agenda - an agenda which was adopted in 1979 following the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The lack of substantive progress on a number of those agenda items would, at the least, suggest that, more than ten years later, there was scope to set them aside and consider issues which might lend themselves to more fruitful discussion.

To contend at this stage that consideration of the decalogue from SSOD-I simply requires more "political will" scarcely seems an adequate answer. For Governments to continue to commit resources to the Conference on Disarmament after the chemical weapons negotiations there will need to be changes made to the agenda. Others before me have suggested areas such as conventional weapons and a regional approach to disarmament as possible issues for the Conference on Disarmament to take up. As we look to improvements in the performance of the Conference on Disarmament, our approach should have in mind multilateral arms control and disarmament as a whole. We should ensure therefore that such changes are undertaken in conjunction with the equally necessary reform of the Disarmament Commission.

(Mr. Reese, Australia)

This year the Conference reached agreeement on a mandate to enable the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban to be reconstituted. Australia welcomes that development.

Our commitment in the United Nations General Assembly and elsewhere to securing an NTB is well known. We continue to regard the attainment of an NTB as a matter of urgency, because of the contribution it can make to halting vertical proliferation as well as horizontal proliferation. In the absence of agreement on a negotiating mandate for an NTB we believe that much useful work which will be necessary to put an NTB in place can be undertaken in the Ad hoc Committee. We look forward to getting on with that work.

The Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons began in Geneva yesterday. Along with other States parties to the NPT we will be working for a positive outcome to the Conference. We place the greatest importance on this Treaty because of the unique contribution which it makes to the nuclear non-proliferation régime. The non-proliferation achievements of this Treaty should not be put at risk to achieve other goals, including that of a nuclear test ban, important as such an objective is. We must work for both objectives. We must ensure that the NPT can continue beyond 1995 to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The increased interest in the NPT, represented by additional signatories and the participation as observers at this Conference of the nuclear-weapon States France and China, is a most encouraging augury.

In conclusion, I would like to thank the Secretary-General, Mr. Komatina, members of the secretariat, the interpreters and my colleagues for the personal and professional association I have enjoyed with them during my time here.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Australia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

His Government has appointed the Ambassador of Australia, Mr. Reese, to other functions, and I congratulate him on that. At the same time, I cannot but express a feeling of regret, for in him the Conference is losing a colleague who has contributed a great deal to its work, both through his personal qualities and through his profound knowledge of disarmament matters. We shall all remember his friendliness and his diplomatic ability. On behalf of the Conference, I wish Ambassador and Mrs. Reese every professional success and personal happiness.

I give the floor to the representative of India, Ambassador Chadha.

Mr. CHADHA (India): Mr. President, may I, at the outset, convey to you my warmest felicitations on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference. We are particularly happy to see a representative from the friendly country of Romania occupying the Chair. My delegation would like to compliment you on the effective guidance you have provided, especially in the

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preparation of the annual report to the General Assembly. I would also like to thank your predecessors, the Ambassadors of Poland and Peru, for their valuable contributions to our work, and all those who have welcomed me in their midst.

As this year's session draws to a close, it is natural to take stock of developments and relate them to the anticipation with which it began. While sustained dialogue has continued between the United States and the Soviet Union on a bilateral basis, the assessment of our work in the Conference on Disarmament this year is somewhat sombre.

Among the nuclear issues on our agenda, the Conference has managed to set up an Ad hoc Committee on item 1, "Nuclear test ban", after a gap of seven years. This was made possible by the spirit of compromise shown by all. We, on our part, had accepted the compromise in the hope that this would mark the beginning of a sincere effort to embark on preparatory work towards the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. We must, therefore, place on record our deep sense of disappointment at the fact that, even before we have agreed upon the programme of work, doubts have arisen about the continuance of the Committee. If its establishment at this session is not to be seen as an eyewash for the commitments towards nuclear disarmament in the context of the forthcoming NPT Review Conference and the PTBT amendment conference, this Ad hoc Committee must resume its work without delay at the beginning of the 1991 session. Most of the nuclear "arms control" agreements, including the INF Treaty, have left the loophole of allowing for the military use of the fissionable material which will be made available as a consequence of the destruction of the delivery vehicles. The development of the third-generation nuclear weapons can be effectively impeded only by a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty which aims at the general and complete cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons by all States in all environments for all time. This goal cannot be attained as long as even one of the nuclear-weapon States remains outside these negotiations, as long as nuclear weapon tests are thought necessary for maintaining a "credible" policy of nuclear deterrence and as long as a comprehensive test ban is treated only as a long-term goal. The aim of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, and consequently its scope, should be to prevent the testing of nuclear weapons and thereby to inhibit, in a non-discriminatory way, the proliferation of nuclear weapons in their horizontal as well as vertical dimension. It cannot be conceived as an instrument designed to curtail technological progress to perpetuate the division of the world into two categories of nations. The interests of the nuclear-weapon States must be taken into account on a basis of complete equality with the interests of the non-nuclear-weapon States. In deciding upon the scope of the treaty we must bear in mind the fact that all the existing international instruments which refer to nuclear tests contain separate provisions for peaceful nuclear explosions.

In the view of my delegation, one of the primary tasks is to achieve tangible progress towards the universally agreed goals of nuclear disarmament and prevention of nuclear war. In this context, it is worthwhile to recall that both the United States and the Soviet Union declared, as far back as 1985, that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The concept

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of a nuclear-weapon-free world was also discussed by the leaders of the two countries at Reykjavik. Despite these commitments, it is a pity that it has not proved possible to set up ad hoc committees even to undertake preliminary work on these subjects. The mandate proposed by the Group of 21 on item 2 reflects two crucial aspects of this issue: the urgency attached to it, and the need to deal with it in the multilateral negotiating framework. It aims at the negotiation of agreements with adequate provisions for verification. It does not lay down rigid time-frames and it is open-ended and flexible. The progress achieved in bilateral negotiations cannot replace genuine multilateral search for universally applicable nuclear disarmament measures. All nations have the most vital interest in this matter, although States which possess nuclear weapons clearly bear a special responsibility.

Similarly, on item 3 of our agenda, the Group of 21 have tabled a draft mandate which is intended to take into account the views of other delegations. On our part, we would favour negotiations on a convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. This proposal has enjoyed widespread support in the General Assembly over the years. Ever since a nuclear weapon was first used in Hiroshima, sentiment has grown overwhelmingly against the use of nuclear weapons. During the 1980s, beginning with the TTAPS report, a number of studies have been carried out on the climatic and global effects of nuclear war, and there is clear consensus among all experts that even a limited nuclear exchange would produce catastrophic and irreversible consequences for our biosphere. In spite of the 1988 bilateral agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union establishing the nuclear risk reduction centres, the possibility of a nuclear war still exists and the stakes are still the same.

On item 5 of our agenda, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", once again a number of concrete proposals have been reiterated, in a repetition of the exercise in which the Ad hoc Committee on this item has been engaged in since 1985. Our future work needs to be structured and organized in a way that enables us to undertake fully-fledged negotiations that can strengthen the international legal régime pertaining to outer space. The existing régime does impose some legal restraints on the placement of certain types of weapons in outer space. However, these restraints are neither comprehensive in scope, nor do they apply to all kinds of weapon systems. New legal instruments need to be developed which would reflect the political reality as well as technological developments. Among the proposals that have been put forward, some relate to specific aspects, such as banning ASAT weapons and providing immunity to satellites, and others adopt a comprehensive approach, such as amendment of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty or addition of a protocol to it. While supporting different proposals for negotiating concrete measures aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space, my delegation has placed particular emphasis on a comprehensive agreement which would prohibit the development of anti-satellite weapons and provide for the dismantling of all existing systems. The ABM Treaty places restrictions on the testing of weapons in an ABM mode, but permits weapons to be tested in an ASAT mode. A moratorium on the testing of the existing dedicated anti-satellite weapons needs to be formalized through multilateral negotiations. Complementary proposals have also been put forward to provide immunity to satellites,

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especially those that generate opportunities for economic growth and international security. However, confidence-building measures such as "rules of the road", "keep-out zones", etc., provide only a limited immunity; full immunity can only be provided by a verifiable comprehensive ASAT ban.

Let me now turn to the subject of the chemical weapons negotiations. The necessary framework to deal with the pending issues was set up at the beginning of this year through the resourceful and methodical leadership provided by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Hyltenius, and his hardworking delegation. Yet, as the session draws to a close and we take stock of the situation, our feelings are mixed. Undeniably, we have made some progress, but, against the background of the political will and the sense of urgency expressed in Paris last year, the progress has been disappointing.

We must recognize that time is running out and accept the political fact that the only way to rid mankind of chemical weapons is through the conclusion of a comprehensive and effectively verifiable convention which ensures that all existing chemical weapons stocks and chemical weapons production facilities are eliminated; and that the further development, production, acquisition, transfer and use of these weapons is prohibited. Interim measures designed to prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons, apart from not being effective, also run the risk of opening up a parallel track which could easily derail ongoing negotiations and confuse the objective towards which we are working. Political reality dictates that the risk does not merely come from the possible use of chemical weapons, but from their very existence, and the only way to address this reality is to find a politically viable solution.

A convention that can enjoy universal adherence must be non-discriminatory, must provide for equal rights and obligations of all States, whether or not they possess chemical weapons, and whether or not they have a large chemical industry. It must contain an effective system of verification that reassures all States parties about compliance. To this end, my delegation is willing to discuss all details regarding such a verification system in any form. It is only through a sustained and frank dialogue that the different perceptions can be resolved, and not through polemics and procedural wrangles that we have witnessed recently, which only retard our progress. The convention should ensure the unimpeded right of States parties to develop, produce, use, exchange and transfer chemicals and technology for peaceful purposes and should not hinder or impede international co-operation in the development of the chemical industry for such purposes.

Adequate provision has already been made in the draft convention for consultations, co-operation and fact-finding; and the periodic conferences of States parties would provide an opportunity for continuous review of the working of the convention. The proposed provision for a special conference of States parties to review the implementation of the principles and objectives of the convention eight years from its entry into force, a conference in which those who possess chemical weapons would be accorded special privileges, far from achieving the desired objective of universality, would in fact have the opposite effect, as States may tend to shy away from joining a convention

(Mr. Chadha, India)

whose future is uncertain and which does not ensure their security from the very beginning. If at all, such an assessment needs to be made on the convention's entry into force by all States which subscribe to it, on an equal footing. The ideal way to ensure universality is to make the convention attractive for those who join it. To this end, the interests of those who possess chemical weapons must be matched by the interests of those who do not, and who will accept curbs on their chemical industry - which plays an important role in their development - in the hope of achieving enhanced security.

On the subject of challenge inspection, India was among those who welcomed the approach adopted by Ambassador Hyltenius. We believe that, once a request for challenge inspection is received, the area of interest is enlarged and becomes the concern of all States parties, who are then legitimately involved in seeking a reassurance that the convention is not being violated. The multilateral character of challenge inspection, therefore, needs to be ensured.

Preliminary discussions have also been held on the subject of the composition of the Executive Council. We believe that the Council must be representative of the interests of all States parties. However, in practice it is possible that certain parties will serve on the Executive Council more frequently than others, in accordance with accepted criteria. This need not be seen to detract from the basic principles of equitable geographic balance, non-discrimination and the need for universal adherence.

We shall be having detailed discussions on Schedules during our inter-sessional work. In our view, specific chemicals should be included in Schedule 1, rather than whole families of chemicals or analogues. Each individual chemical should be assessed for its toxicity level and application range. If found to have no civilian application, a specific chemical could then be included in Schedule 1. Research should also be allowed on those chemicals which have more applications than just weapons use. Adopting a very narrow view on the thresholds for Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals will only stifle the chemical industry. The interests of security have to be matched with the objectives of development. It is with this aim in mind that my delegation has always adopted an attitude of flexible dialogue on all aspects and forms of verification for the proposed convention.

I am sure that we all share the sense of urgency and realize that the chemical weapons negotiations are at a critical stage. Taking the priority of the nuclear issues into account, we hope that the Conference on Disarmament will set itself a time-frame within which to conclude its negotiations on a chemical weapons convention.

This is also the most propitious time to give some thought to the relationship between disarmament and development. In the simplest terms, disarmament and development are linked, because both the arms race and the process of development compete for scarce resources. The arms build up not only pre-empts scarce resources, but also distorts economic structures, undermines economic systems - both national and international - and vitiates

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the atmosphere for international co-operation. The Conference on Disarmament will do well to seize its opportunity for halting the arms race, and for building a new structure of international security.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of India, Ambassador Chadha, for his statement and for his kind words concerning the Chair, my country and the relations between India and Romania.

I give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, Ambassador Donowaki, to introduce the report of the Ad hoc Committee, which has been issued as document CD/1035.

Mr. DONOWAKI (Japan): Mr. President, first of all, my delegation wishes to join with others in extending to you congratulations upon your assumption of the very important post of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. You have been guiding our work with excellent leadership and skill and, in accordance with the procedures to be adopted, we understand that the work as President will continue on into the inter-sessional period and, together with the incoming new President for next year's session, the responsibility of the presidency will continue to be very important. Our delegation pledges that we will support you in the discharge of your responsibilities. Also, I should like to say that my delegation feels very sorry to lose our colleague, Ambassador David Reese, and I should like to express my congratulations and wish him all the best in his new responsibilities.

Today, I am going to take the floor as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban", and I am happy to introduce to the Conference the report which is contained in document CD/1035. As we know, the Ad hoc Committee was established on 17 July, since when it has had four substantive meetings: on 20 July, 27 July, 6 August and 9 August, and two meetings in order to adopt its report. Throughout those meetings on substance, the discussion was very fruitful and lively and touched on various issues relating to the scope, structure, compliance and verification; the progress of the discussions is contained in this report. Also, at the meeting of 6 August, the Committee had an opportunity to hear from the officials of the Ad hoc Group of Seismic Experts which proved to be useful indeed to the work of the Committee. Also, at the suggestion of various delegations, the Committee had an opportunity to hear from the chief negotiators in the bilateral talks on nuclear testing between the United States and Soviet Union. As Chairman, I should like to express again gratefulness for all the kindness of the delegations of the United States and Soviet Union in making those two chief negotiators available to appear at our Conference.

I will not go into the detail of the report because the contents have already been discussed to the full in the Ad hoc Committee and the text has been circulated to you by the secretariat. In general, it was the agreement of the Ad hoc Committee that, in spite of the short time it had at its disposal, the Committee carried out a preliminary examination of specific and interrelated test-ban issues. And, bearing in mind the long lapse we had for seven years before the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee, it was

(Mr. Donowaki, Japan)

recognized by the Committee that those initial discussions we had in the Ad hoc Committee were useful in preparing for the future consideration of the issue. There was also agreement that substantive work on the agenda item should continue at the 1991 session of the Conference.

I should like to also refer to one aspect of the work of the Committee. The Committee, when it was established, decided not to agree on the programme of work for this year because of the shortness of the time it had, and the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee was taken as a de facto programme of work for this year. On the other hand, as Chairman I conducted prior consultations on the question of a programme of work for possible future reference, and such an exercise was regarded as useful in order to save time for the future Ad hoc Committee at the beginning of the session when it is to be re-established. And such prior consultation has been conducted by myself. However, as stated in paragraph 31 of the report, the work has not been completed and there have been many suggestions that during the inter-sessional period of the Conference on Disarmament the work should be continued. I realize that, unlike in the case of the very important negotiations on the chemical weapons convention, where the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee is authorized to continue negotiations, the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban does not function in that manner. However, because of the suggestions made, I have agreed to continue, not as Chairman, but as an individual, the consultations among the members of the Conference on the question of the programme of work during the inter-sessional period. And since I understand that, in accordance with new procedures which are going to be adopted, the outgoing President and the incoming president of the Conference are indeed in charge of those questions, I hope you will give me appropriate guidance.

Finally, I should like to express my sincere appreciation for the co-operation extended to me by the Chair and by all my colleagues around the table. I should also like to express my thanks to the secretariat, particularly Mr. Cassandra, who acted as Secretary, and to all the members of the secretariat, including the interpreters and the Conference Service.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban for his introduction of the Committee's report and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I congratulate him on having concluded the work on a particularly important item of our agenda. Like many others of us, I can attest and pay tribute to the effort, patience and constructiveness that characterized the work done by Ambassador Donowaki.

I give the floor to the representative of Canada, Ambassador Shannon, to introduce, in his capacity as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, the report of that Committee, which is contained in document CD/1034.

Mr. SHANNON (Canada): Before I present my report, I would like to join others in thanking Ambassador Reese of Australia for his very strong contribution to the Conference and wish him well in his new assignment.

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

In my capacity as this year's Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, it gives me great pleasure to present to the Conference on Disarmament our report, which was circulated earlier as document CD/OS/CRP.7/Rev.1 of 10 August and is now before all delegations as document CD/1034 of 16 August. I understand from the secretariat that all language versions of the draft report will have been circulated within the next 24 hours, which, it is hoped, will provide enough review time to enable the draft to be adopted by plenary at our next meeting of Friday, 24 August.

Now that our work in the Ad hoc Committee for this session has come to a close, I would also like to express my sincere thanks to all those delegates and experts who contributed to our endeavours. In particular, I would like to thank the various group co-ordinators, Ambassador Arteaga and Ms. Clauwaert Gonzalez of Venezuela; Ambassador Bayart and Mr. Erendo of Mongolia, and later Ambassador Králik and Mr. Gašpar of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic; Ambassador Hou and Mr. Zhang of China, and Ambassador Morel and Mr. Finaud of France. And a very special word of thanks and appreciation is due to the Ad hoc Committee's secretarial staff, Mr. Vladimir Bogomolov and Ms. Audrey Williamson, and to the interpreters. I thank them all.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Canada, Mr. Shannon, for introducing the report of the Ad hoc Committee. I would also like to express our appreciation to him for the work he did in steering the work of the Committee. I would also like to echo the expression of thanks that were made at the last meeting of the Ad hoc Committee with respect to his diplomatic skills.

I give the floor now to the distinguished representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Batsanov.

Mr. BATSANOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Today I would like to present joint information by the USSR and the United States of America on the sixteenth round of bilateral consultations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, which was held here in Geneva from 7 to 16 August 1990. During 1990, the USSR and the United States have been actively conducting consultations on questions relating to a chemical weapons ban that complement the multilateral negotiations on the convention. On 8 March and 24 April the Conference on Disarmament was provided with information on the fourteenth and fifteenth rounds of these consultations respectively and today, by agreement with the head of the United States delegation, Ambassador Ledogar, I am presenting information on the sixteenth round.

During this round the delegations began to develop a document on inspection procedures which will contain detailed provisions about the implementation of inspection measures within the framework of the Agreement signed by the Presidents of the USSR and the United States on 1 June 1990 on

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destruction and non-production of chemical weapons and on measures to facilitate the multilateral convention banning chemical weapons. It is planned to conclude the preparation of the document on inspection procedures by 31 December 1990.

An understanding was reached during this round that the document will consist of four sections dealing with general provisions on the preparation and conduct of inspections and inspections at chemical weapons destruction facilities, storage facilities and production facilities. In drawing up the document on inspections, the sides have agreed to utilize to the maximum extent the already available provisions from the draft convention on a chemical weapons ban which is on the negotiating table of the Conference on Disarmament. This approach is intended not only to accelerate the preparation of the bilateral document, but also to provide valuable experience for the practical implementation of the provisions worked out at the multilateral negotiations and concerning verification of the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons.

As is known, with a view to gaining experience and facilitating the elaboration and implementation of the future convention, the USSR and United States also agreed within the framework of the bilateral Agreement of 1 June 1990 to conduct bilateral trial challenge inspections. During the sixteenth round the delegations started to prepare detailed provisions for such trial inspections, including the number and location of facilities to be inspected and the procedures to be followed. A preliminary understanding was reached on the conduct of two trial inspections. The discussion of issues concerning trial inspections will be continued in order to reach agreement on the requisite arrangements.

During the round, special consultations continued on questions of co-operation between the USSR and the United States with respect to methods and technology for the destruction of chemical weapons. Highly qualified experts from both sides who are directly involved in the preparation and execution of national programmes for the destruction of chemical weapons in the USSR and the United States participated in these discussions. There was an exchange of information on the state of implementation of these national programmes. The experts also discussed issues concerning: the preparation of the Soviet and United States safety and remissions standards, including monitoring by instruments of compliance with them; the transport of chemical weapons for destruction; the prevention of accidents at chemical weapons destruction facilities and the handling of emergencies; and control of the process of chemical weapons destruction. Both sides were of the opinion that these were useful discussions.

In accordance with the existing agreement, on 21 and 22 August 1990 a group of United States specialists will be visiting the Soviet Union's Chapaevsk training centre for personnel of chemical weapons destruction facilities. During this visit there will be, inter alia, discussions on matters related to the technology for destroying chemical weapons based on

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phosphoro-organic compounds. A visit by a group of Soviet experts is planned for this autumn to the destruction facility on Johnston Atoll, which in July of this year began actual operations on the destruction of United States chemical weapons.

Discussions continued during the round on matters relating to the implementation of the Wyoming Memorandum. They concerned both the exchange of data which has taken place and the visits already made to Soviet and United States facilities in the context of the Memorandum.

Particular attention was devoted during the round to questions concerning the preparation of a multilateral convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Both sides expressed concern over the slow pace of the negotiations. The delegations reviewed the basic questions still unresolved in order to compare the USSR and United States approaches and to determine the likelihood of the early attainment of consensus in the multilateral negotiations.

Despite being relatively short, the sixteenth round of the bilateral consultations - which, as I have already said, lasted from 7 to 16 August - proved a very rich one from the point of view of both the amount of work accomplished during the ten days and of the results achieved. The parties agreed to conduct the next round of bilateral consultations during the autumn of 1990.

That is the end of the joint information which I was presenting on behalf of the two delegations and now, if I may, I would like to say a few words on my own behalf. First of all, I would like to join those representatives who have already taken official farewell from the distinguished Ambassador of Australia, David Reese, who will shortly be leaving Geneva and undertaking important new functions in his capital. I would like to wish him all the very best and every success. His stay here in Geneva was not a long one, but I think we all felt that Ambassador Reese did very productive work here.

Lastly, in presenting his report on the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Hyltenius informed the Conference that agreement has been reached and that I am to be appointed Chairman of this Ad hoc Committee next year. I would like to express my sincere thanks to all delegations for their support and understanding and, of course, to assure you that if I am indeed to assume this post next year, then I, personally and the Soviet delegation will endeavour to perform its duties with honour.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement. We have all taken note with pleasure of his statement concerning his willingness to serve as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons next session.

I have no further speakers on my list. Would any delegation like to take the floor? I see none, and so I would like to move on to other issues.

(The President)

I now submit to the Conference for decision the recommendation in paragraph 16 of the progress report of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events contained in document CD/1032 concerning the dates for the next session of the Group, namely 11-22 February 1991 in Geneva. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts that recommendation.

It was so decided.

I now invite the Conference to take note with appreciation of the report of the Chairman of the open-ended consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference, which has been distributed as document CD/WP.395.

It was so decided.

May I now extend to the representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Kamal, our appreciation for the very efficient way in which he steered the open-ended informal consultations. The results of his efforts are embodied in the draft decision that we shall be considering today.

I now intend to suspend the plenary meeting so that we may hold an informal plenary to consider the draft decision contained in document CD/WP.396. The Conference will then resume the formal plenary to continue its consideration of this draft decision. The plenary meeting is suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 11.40 a.m. and resumed at 12.30 p.m.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): the 575th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed. The Conference will continue its consideration of the draft decision contained in document CD/WP.396 concerning the effective and improved functioning of the Conference on Disarmament. As we have had an informal discusson on the subject and there have been some changes to the text, I will give the floor to Ambassador Berasategui to tell us how the draft decision, on which I hope there will be consensus, now reads.

Mr. BERASATEGUI (Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference): As a result of the informal meeting just held, a number of changes have been introduced in document CD/WP.396. The first change concerns paragraph 5, subparagrah (c), which will now read: "that the principal debate on the establishment of subsidiary bodies and their mandates shall be held during the first two weeks of the annual session; and". The second change is to be made in subparagraph (d) of the same paragraph 5 and will consist in the deletion of the last part of the subparagraph, reading "to whom the responsibility could be handed over", and its replacement by the words: "to assist in carrying out informal consultations with a view to reaching consensus".

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Thank you, Ambassador Berasategui. May I take it that, with these alterations, this text, that is to say document CD/WP.396, can be adopted?

It was so decided. */

If there is no further business, I would now like to give you some information about the progress of work on the draft annual report of the Conference to the United Nations General Assembly. I shall read this out fairly slowly so that delegations can take note of the technical details of what remains to be done.

With the introduction today of the reports of the Ad hoc Committees on agenda items 1, 4 and 5, the work of the subsidiary bodies has come to an end. I shall submit the three reports to the Conference for adoption at the final plenary meeting - to be held this Friday - before we take a decision on the annual report to the General Assembly. For the second reading of the technical sections and of the substantive paragraphs on agenda items 2, 3, 7 and 8, which will take place at an informal meeting on Friday, at 4.30 p.m. before the final plenary meeting, we shall have the following documentation: on the techical sections, working paper CD/WP.388 and document CD/WP.388/Corr.1, which sets out additions and corrections made after the first reading of the technical sections; on the substantive paragraphs, working papers CD/WP.391/Rev.3, 392/Rev.1, 393/Rev.2 and 394/Rev.1. These documents, in all the official languages of the Conference, will be placed in delegations' pigeon-holes as from 5 p.m. tomorrow, so that you have time to study them before the second reading of the draft report.

As you know, the secretariat was also to prepare an index, by country and topic, of the records for the annual session of 1990. I have been informed that the draft index will be distributed on Tuesday, 4 September, and that the secretariat will receive corrections from delegations up until 14 September at noon, before the final text is included in the annexes of the annual report.

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*/ In connection with this decision, the President of the Conference made the following statement at the 576th plenary meeting: "During the open-ended consultations, firstly 'there was consensus also on the need to encourage speakers to limit their interventions to 15 minutes each' and secondly, 'all interventions welcomed as positive and constructive the procedure followed during the current session, according to which the applications of non-member States were all considered together, and not one by one. Consensus existed in the hope that this practice would continue to be followed in future sessions with the same results'."

(The President)

Allow me now to inform you how we shall proceed on Friday. The informal meeting for the second reading of the draft annual report will start at 4.30 p.m. Immediately afterwards the Conference will hold a plenary meeting to adopt the reports of the Ad hoc Committees and the annual report to the United Nations General Assembly. I would appreciate it if delegations wishing to take the floor at Friday's plenary meeting would register with the secretariat and say in doing so whether they wish to make their statements before or after the adoption of our annual report.

I have no further business for today. The Conference will hold an informal meeting on Friday, 24 August, at 4.30 p.m. and the last plenary meeting for 1990 will take place immediately after that informal meeting.

The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.